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and thus should be able to leave questions of special circumstances to the
NMB.
The Ruby case presents a possible exception to the proposed rule, regard-
less of whether the NMB has as yet made its determination whether to hold an
election. When the carrier has clear and reliable evidence that one union enjoys
majority support, then for the sake of stability it should be allowed to bargain
with that union. In Ruby, however, the evidence upon which the airline relied
was authorization cards,47 which the NLRB has held are not reliable due to
the possibility of duplications." This unreliability was assuaged in Ruby
by the fact that 90 percent of the employees had authorized one of the
unions, since, even if some employees authorized both unions, it is unlikely
that 40 percent would sign two cards. Unless there is this overwhelming
percentage, however, authorization cards should not be relied upon as an ac-
curate indication of the support that a union enjoys.
LAWRENCE T. BENCH
Trade Regulation—Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act-
TBA Sales Commission Plans an Unfair Method of Competition.—
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC. 1—In 1956 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
instituted three separate proceedings against several major oil companies
and rubber companies 2 alleging that their sales commission method of dis-
tributing tires, batteries and accessories (TBA) was an unfair method of com-
petition in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 2
Under the sales commission plans, the rubber companies paid commissions to
the oil companies on sales of the rubber companies' TBA to the oil companies'
dealers. One of the proceedings paired Texaco, Inc. with B.F. Goodrich
Company. The Texaco distribution system was composed of some 30,000
dealers constituting 16.5 percent of all the service stations in the United
States. Texaco controlled the supply of oil and gas to its dealers and bore
the heavy cost of constructing and maintaining the service stations through
the use of loans, short term leases and equipment financing. Texaco's policy
with regard to TBA sales was to require its salesmen to become familiar
with the sponsored product, yet at the same time to "render equal assistance
to all dealers . . regardless of the brand of merchandise handled." Its
policy statement provided: "Our dealers, consignees and distributors are
independent businessmen, and instructions that no undue influence is to be
47 323 F.2d at 252.
48 See note 38 supra; see generally 1966-1967 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
Law, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 171, 801-08 (1967).
1 383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. granted, 390 U.S. 979 (1968).
2 B.F. Goodrich Co., No. 6485 (FTC Jan. 11, 1956); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
No. 6486 (FTC Jan. 11, 1956); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 6487 (FTC Jan. 11,
1956).
3 Is U.S.C. § 45 (1964). Section 5 provides: "Unfair methods of competition in
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful."
4 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d 942, 948 n.I2 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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used to interfere with their free and independent judgment remain un-
changed." 5
In 1961 the FTC rendered decisions in each of the three TBA cases .°
Two of the three cases, Atlantic-Goodyear and Shell-Firestone yielded findings
of coercion, unlawful tie-ins, and adverse competitive effects resulting from
the sales commission agreements. In Texaco-Goodrich, the Commission
found no coercion and remanded the case to the hearing examiner for addi-
tional evidence on anticompetitive effects. Without taking the additional
evidence the examiner concluded that the sales commission plan was unlaw-
ful. This conclusion was affirmed by the Commission in 1963? On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed
the complaint on the ground that in the absence of proof of coercive tactics or
use of controlling economic power to force dealers to buy the sponsored
products there is "nothing illegal or even unethical in the payment of com-
missions for such services ...." 8
Meanwhile, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the FTC's finding of illegality with regard to the Atlantic-Goodyear
plan.° The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 1° affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court then
granted the FTC's petition for a writ of certiorari in Texaco and remanded
that case to the FTC for further proceedings in the light of Atlantic.' 1 In
January 1966, the FTC held that the Atlantic case compelled the conclusion
that the Texaco-Goodrich plan was unlawful and that both Texaco and Good-
rich should be prohibited from performing or entering into any other sales
commission plans.12 Texaco then brought the present appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. HELD: reversed. The noncoercive
Texaco-Goodrich sales commission plan is not an unfair method of competi-
tion as proscribed by section 5." The court concluded that Atlantic did not
make sales commission plans per se unlawful, stating that three conditions
must exist before a TBA sales commission plan will be found unlawful: (1)
the oil company must possess dominant economic power over its dealers; (2)
the oil company must exercise that power over its dealers by overt coercion
or covert practices designed to pressure dealers into taking the sponsored TBA;
and (3) anticompetitive effects must result from use of that power. 14 The
court conceded Texaco's dominant economic power over its dealers. It
5 Id.
6 Goodyear The & Rubber Co., 58 F.T.C. 309 (1961) ; Firestone The & Rubber Co.,
58 F.T.C. 371 (1961) ; B.F. Goodrich Co., 58 F.T.C. 1176 (1961).
7 B.F. Goodrich Co., 62 F.T.C. 1172 (1963).
8 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated and remanded
per curiam, 381 U.S. 739 (1965). See Note, 6 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 375 (1965).
9 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1964).
10 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
11 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 381 U.S. 739 (1965).
12 B.F. Goodrich Co., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 17,424 (FTC
1966). The Commission thought it appropriate to enter virtually the same prohibitions
against Texaco and Goodrich that the Supreme Court had approved in Atlantic. Id.
at 22,656.
73 383 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
74 Id. at 945.
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refused, however, to conclude that Texaco exploited its service station
market by using its dominant economic power to compel its dealers to pur-
chase sponsored TBA. Neither did the court find that the dominant power
of Texaco over its dealers resulted in anticompetitive effects. Since the
Atlantic case was so crucial to the Texaco decision, Atlantic is an appro-
priate starting place for analysis of the Texaco decision.
The Atlantic sales commission plan generally involved the same con-
tractual provisions as other TBA plans. In addition to the contractual
provisions, the Atlantic-Goodyear plan was characterized, among other things,
by: (1) overt threats to cancel dealers' licenses; (2) dual solicitation of
Atlantic's dealers by representatives of both companies to convert the dealers
to Goodyear products; (3) policing of dealers to see that they met their
purchasing quotas of Goodyear TBA; and (4) assigning to each dealer one
single point of TBA supply. 15 These practices were obviously designed to
increase the pressure on Atlantic's dealers to buy the sponsored TBA.
The Supreme Court analyzed the Atlantic-Goodyear sales commission
plan by comparing it with illegal tying arrangements. Tying arrangements
exist when a seller conditions the sale of one product on the purchase of some
other product of the seller." The substance of a tie may exist even where
there is no express conditioning of the sale of the tying product. The illegal
condition may be implied from a course of dealing, it may result from coercion
or it may be voluntary." The crucial factor is whether, as a practical matter,
the buyer must take both products to get one." The Supreme Court has
said that "tying agreements serve hardly any useful purpose beyond the
suppression of competition."" The manner in which the tie suppresses com-
petition is to allow the seller to compel unmerited recognition in the market
for the tied product, in which he has no power, because of his strong position
in the market for the tying product. 2° If the tying product is desirable, and
the seller's position in the market for that product is substantial, the con-
ditioning of the sale of the tying product to the purchase of the tied product
will result in purchasers shifting their purchases of the tied product to the
seller of the tying product with a resulting foreclosure of other sellers of the
tied product from these markets. The Atlantic Court recognized that just
as the tying agreement allows the seller to utilize power in one market to cur-
15 Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. at 365. The Court noted the "undeniable
success" of the Atlantic-Goodyear sales commission plan. Within seven months after
the plan went into effect, "Goodyear has signed up 96% and 98%, respectively, of
Atlantic's dealers in two of the three areas assigned to it." Id. at 366. Goodyear enjoyed
this success in spite of the fact that just a few years earlier, a survey had indicated that
"67% of the dealers had preferred Lee tires and 76% Exide batteries." Id. at 369. A
good deal of this success was undoubtedly the result of the exercise of Atlantic's dominant
economic power.
le Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
17 See McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338 (4th Cir.
1959).
18 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922) ; Pearson,
Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Policy, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 626, 630 (1965).
19 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
29 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
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tail competition in another, so also does the Goodyear-Atlantic sales com-
mission plan result in such effects.21 It felt that the economic power of
Atlantic in the service station market and the sales commission plan,
"bolstered" by the pressuring practices engaged in by Atlantic, had the effect
of limiting the dealers' freedom to purchase the TBA of their choice. 22
The Atlantic Court stated that when conduct resembles recognized anti-
trust violations, the FTC may look to cases dealing with those violations for
guidance with regard to the standard of illegality. 22 Since the restraint in this
case was similar to a tie, the law of tying should be examined in order to
determine the standard. Tying arrangements are generally considered to be
illegal per se. 24 The per se rule eliminates the necessity of proving the anti-
competitive effects of a particular restraint. As applied to tying, the per se rule
requires proof that a "non insubstantial" amount of commerce is affected. 25
Whether the Court applied the tying rule to the Atlantic facts is not clear,
even though the Court said that this approach could be taken by the Com-
mission. The Court first stated:
Goodyear and Atlantic contend that the Commission should
have made a far more extensive economic analysis of the competitive
effect of the sales-commission plan, examining the entire market
in tires, batteries and accessories. But just as the effect of this plan
is similar to that of a tie-in, so is it unnecessary to embark upon
a full-scale economic analysis of competitive effect. We think it
enough that the Commission found that a not insubstantial portion
of commerce is affected. 2°
This language, taken alone would seem to indicate that the Court did indeed
apply the per se tying standard of illegality to the Atlantic-Goodyear TBA
plan. Although the FTC has argued for this interpretation in the courts of
appeals which subsequent to Atlantic decided the two companion cases, 27
this interpretation of Atlantic has not been judicially accepted. On the con-
trary, the courts of appeals in both Shell Oil Co. v. FTC28 and the instant case
have looked to other language in the Atlantic opinion and concluded that
a showing of the economic effect on the market is necessary to a finding of
illegality. The Texaco opinion even concluded that the Atlantic opinion was
"very clear" on this point1 2° These courts cited the following statement from
Atlantic as indicative of the necessity of considering the full record for ex-
amples of anticompetitive effects: "The anticompetitive effects of this pro-
gram are clear on the record and render unnecessary extensive economic
analysis of market percentages or business justifications in determining
21 381 U.S. at 370.
22 Id. at 371.
23 Id. at 369.
24 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
25 Id. at 6; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
28 381 U.S. at 371.
27 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d 942, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC,
360 F.2d 470, 476 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
28 360 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966).
29 383 F.2d at 949.
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whether this was a method of competition which Congress has declared un-
fair and therefore unlawful."" Further, the courts of appeals noted that the
Supreme Court in Atlantic did not disapprove of the FTC's inquiry into the
"whole record" in order to conclude that the economic effects of the sales
commission plan "impaired competition at three levels of the tires, batteries
and accessories industry."31
In analyzing the Texaco decision, two questions must be considered;
namely, whether a sales commission plan must be coupled with coercive
practices before it may be considered an unfair method of competition, and,
if a noncoercive sales commission plan may be an unfair method of competi-
tion, whether there must be a showing of anticompetitive effects before the
plan can be considered a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. The Texaco
court required a showing of coercive practices and proof of anticompetitive
effects. These requirements were derived by the court from the Atlantic
opinion.
The conclusion of the Texaco court that the Atlantic decision requires
a showing of coercion may not be a necessary one, although it is true that the
Supreme Court made many references to the coercive practices in the
Atlantic record.32
 In discussing the FTC's findings orl the issue of fore-
closure, the issue which was crucial to the analogy to tying arrangements,
the Court, however, made the following statement:
[The Commission] found that . . . manufacturers of competing
brands . . . were foreclosed from the Atlantic market. In addition,
it recognized the obvious fact that Firestone and Goodyear were
excluded from selling to Atlantic's dealers in each other's territories.
Both of these effects on competition flowed from the contract
itself .33
 (Emphasis added.)
One implication which may be drawn from this language is that the fore-
closure of competing manufacturers from the TBA market was caused by
the sales commission plan itself and that therefore the discussion of coercion
was merely the Court's method of showing the aggravated nature of the
Atlantic-Goodyear plan.
An analysis of the Court's discussion of the remedial order in Atlantic
reveals a further indication that the Court sought to prohibit some non-
coercive sales commission plans. As to Atlantic, the order completely pro-
hibited the use of sales commission plans. 34
 The Court noted that the Com-
mission could have limited its order to coercive plans, but that apparently
the Commission felt that unless all plans were prohibited "dealers would
not enjoy complete freedom from unfair practices . . . ."32 In discussing the
remedy as to Goodyear, the Court threw some light on the Atlantic situation,
noting that the tendency toward coercion results from the market power of
30 381 U.S. at 371.
31 Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 383 F.2d at 949; Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d at 478.
32 381 U.S. at 366-68, 372, 374.
33 Id. at 370.
34 Id. at 372.
33 Id. at 372-73.
820
CASE NOTES
the oil company over its dealers." The Atlantic Refining Co. had such power
and coercion resulted. To bolster this conclusion the Court also noted that
Goodyear had sales commission plans with 20 other oil companies, at least
four of which had substantial power over their dealers, and where pressures
similar to those in Atlantic were exerted." Although the FTC could and
apparently did prohibit Goodyear from using any sales commission plans,
the Court seemed to recognize a distinction between plans and limited the
order accordingly when it stated:
This order does not necessarily prohibit Goodyear from mak-
ing contracts with companies not possessed of economic power over
their dealers. The evidence in this particular record, however, does
involve relationships such as it has enjoyed with Atlantic and its
propensity to use those relationships for an unfair competitive
advantage. Goodyear offered no evidence that it has arrangements
differing from those mentioned in the instant case. In these circum-
stances it is sufficient to point out that in the event it has such a
contract with such a company it may seek a reopening of the order
approved today."
This statement distinguishes between those cases in which there is a retail
distribution system dominated by a major oil refiner and those where there
is no such dominance. Combining this statement with the facts of Atlantic
and the four other coercive relationships referred to above, it would appear
that a noncoercive sales commission plan will almost necessarily be an unfair
method of competition when the oil company dominates its dealers, although
it may not be when there is no such dominance. Since dominance was con-
ceded by the court of appeals in Texaco,3° the plan should have been held
to be an unfair method of competition because of its tendency to foster
coercive practices and because of its inherent effect in foreclosing competitors
of the TBA supplier.
Assuming, however, that the Texaco court was correct in reading
Atlantic as turning on a finding of coercive practices, it is submitted that a
finding of coercion is not necessary for a sales commission plan to be held an
unfair method of competition, in that, even absent coercion, the plan causes
the same undesirable results as a tying agreement. Recalling the control
Texaco had over its dealers because it was the source of their gas and oil
supply and was frequently the lessor of their stations and equipment, it
would seem highly unlikely that a dealer would lightly consider the sug-
gestions and recommendations of the Texaco representative who solicited
his TBA order. Even if the dealer knows that the oil company's sales policy
will not allow his franchise to be cancelled if he refuses to buy the sponsored
TBA he may not want to risk testing the application of that policy and the
loss of the time and money that he has spent in developing his business at a
certain location. This risk is heightened by the reluctance of competing oil
38 Id. at 373.
37 Id. at 375.
38 Id. at 376-77.
39 383 F.2d at 946.
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companies to franchise a dealer who has been cancelled by another oil com-
pany, especially if the cancellation was for lack of cooperation." Further-
more, with regard to the "suggestion and recommendations" of the oil
company's representative, the question always arises as to whether it was
merely suggestive or whether it was understood by the dealer as a threat.
If the dealer did not regard the purchase of sponsored TBA as a condi-
tion for maintaining his dealership, at a minimum, it would be safe to assume
that if the merits of competing brands of TBA are nearly equal, the average
dealer would tend to choose the sponsored brand to please his company,
especially when he knows that the company stands to gain financially from
his purchase." Such a result would give the sponsored TBA an unmerited
advantage in the market of the sponsoring oil company." Thus in the absence
of coercive practices or economic pressures, the sales commission plan, in and
of itself, will cause the same anticompetitive results that are caused by the
coercive sales commission plan or the tying agreement.
The restrictiveness of the sales commission plan is heightened when it
is understood that this method of distribution is not available to all TEA
suppliers." In order to offer a sales commission plan, a supplier must enjoy
general public acceptance and be able to offer a complete line of TBA to its
service station customers." Furthermore, the supplier must have distribution
facilities at least as widespread as are the dealers of its customers in order to
service them." It is virtually impossible for any but the largest supplier to
meet these requirements4° Consequently, in addition to being foreclosed from
the service station market tied up by large TBA suppliers, the small manu-
facturers and distributors are automatically excluded from soliciting for sales
commission plans of their own.
Assuming, therefore, that a noncoercive sales commission plan is an
unfair method of competition, the next question to be encountered is whether
there must be a showing of anticompetitive effects before the plan can be
considered a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. As previously indicated,
there is language in the Atlantic opinion relied upon to support both a
negative and affirmative response. Which response the Court intended, how-
ever, may have been clarified by its decision in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 47
its most recent decision concerning Section 5 of the FTC Act. In Brown Shoe,
40 See Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 204-12 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 975 (1958).
41 For the importance of such a financial connection to a finding of illegality, see
Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934, 939 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 954 (1965).
42 The argument that tying arrangements are bad because the tied product does
not "compete on its own merits" has been accepted by the Supreme Court. Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) ; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953). But see Pearson, supra note 18, at 636.
4° Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d at 472-73 n.4; Klaus, Analysis of the Sales-
Commission System of Tires, Batteries, and Accessories, Distribution in Retrospect:
Answers for an Incisive Dissent, 44 Tex. L. Rev. 890, 912 (1966).
44 Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d at 472-73 n.4.45 Id.
4° Id.
42 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
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the second largest manufacturer of shoes in the nation offered free of charge
to hundreds of its dealers certain valuable services among which were
architectural plans, costly merchandising records, services of a Brown field
representative, and a right to participate in group insurance at lower rates
than the dealers could obtain individually. In return for these services the
dealers promised that they would deal primarily with Brown and would not
purchase conflicting lines of shoes from Brown's competitors. The Court
sustained the FTC's finding that the practice was an unfair method of com-
petition. According to the Court, the practice violated the "central policies"
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act because it
restricted purchaser freedom on the open market.48 When the respondent
objected that there was insufficient market analysis presented to sustain a
finding that the practice "may substantially lessen competition" the Court
replied:
We reject the argument that proof of this § 3 element must be made
for as we pointed out above our cases hold that the Commission has
power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency with-
out proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the
Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws. 49
The Brown Shoe opinion emphasizes the FTC's findings of effective fore-
closure of Brown's competitors from a substantial number of shoe retailers 59
and the removal of the retailer's freedom to buy in the open market. 51 The
Court thus appears to he saying that when a practice which deprives buyers
of their freedom of choice and forecloses competitors of the firm imposing
the restriction is challenged under Section 5 of the FTC Act, no proof of
anticompetitive effects is necessary. 52 While the facts of Atlantic and Brown
Shoe are different in some respects (Atlantic is similar to a tie while Brown
Shoe is more closely related to an exclusive dealing contract), in both cases
the practice is subject to attack on the grounds that it forecloses competitors
and deprives purchasers of their freedom of choice. After Brown Shoe,
section 5 cases, at least those with the characteristics of the Brown Shoe
case no longer require proof of anticompetitive effects. Thus if Atlantic had
reached the Supreme Court after Brown Shoe and the Court had followed its
decision in that case, no proof of effects would be required. The Court would
not have borrowed the burden of proof from the tying cases as the FTC
claims it did in Atlantic; nor would it have required proof of effects as the
courts of appeals said it did in Atlantic. On the contrary, the Court would
merely have examined the practice, found foreclosure and restraint on the
purchaser, and affirmed the FTC's finding of illegality. By failing to con-
48 Id. at 321.
45 Id. at 322.
50 Brown admitted that approximately 250 of its retailers had executed written
franchise agreements and that over 400 others had entered into its franchise program
without execution of the franchise agreement. Id. at 318-19.
51 Id. at 321.
52 It has been stated that the Brown Shoe decision is inconsistent with antitrust
policy which would require at least a demonstration of anticompetitive effects as a
standard of illegality. Pearson, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as Anti-
trust: A Comment, 47 B.U.L. Rev. 1, 17 (1967).
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sider the Brown Shoe case, the court of appeals in Texaco ignored the most
recent relevant decision from the Supreme Court on the standard of illegality
in a section 5 case.
The foregoing discussion would seem to indicate that the standards of
illegality allegedly derived from Atlantic were either not present in that case
or, if arguably present, have been removed by the subsequent Brown Shoe
opinion. The court in Texaco should, therefore, have affirmed the FTC's
finding of illegality. The sales commission plan, in the situation where the
sponsor dominates a "captive market" should have been held to be inherently
anticompetitive thus eliminating the necessity of coercion; and the require-
ment of proof of the substantial lessening of competition should also have been
unnecessary.
In addition to being analyzed as a case involving a "practice," the sales
commission plan can be regarded as one involving industry "structure." 53
While the plan does not involve a merger or consolidation in the usual sense
of those terms, it may be considered an integration by contract. Indeed, the
Supreme Court cited with approval statements of the lower court in Atlantic:
[T] he sales commission plan enabled Goodyear "to integrate
[into] its own nationwide distribution system the economic power
possessed by Atlantic over its wholesale and retail petroleum out-
lets." . . . Indeed, the most striking aspect of the program, in the
Commission's view, was the degree to which the petitioners worked
together to achieve the program's success. A Goodyear representa-
tive put it very neatly when he said: "After years of courtship
Atlantic and Goodyear have wed. . . . We welcome wholeheartedly
this merger." 54
The question is whether the structural characteristics of this plan produce
the same kind of destructive effect on competition as those condemned by
Section 7 of the Clayton Act so as to warrant condemnation as an unfair
method of competition.
The TBA sales commission plan achieves by contract the same result
that may be achieved by a merger of a customer and a supplier. The TBA
suppliers, by means of the sales commission plan, can be said to have acquired
the means of distribution over which the oil companies have dominant power.
While it is true that the service station operators are theoretically "in-
dependent businessmen," 55 in fact, they are really "economic serfs" 5° subject
to the dominant power of their supplier and landlord. Looked at in this light,
the oil company is the customer and once the TBA supplier has contracted
with the oil company, the integration of customer with supplier is complete. As
the Atlantic Court stated, "It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there
would have been little point in paying substantial commissions to oil com-
panies were it not for their ability to exert power over their wholesalers and
dealers ... . "37
63 1 L. Schwartz, Free Enterprise and Economic Organization 225 (3d ed. 1966).
54 381 US. at 373.
55 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 331 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1964).
56 Id.
37 381 U.S. at 376.
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The similarities between the result in the market for TBA caused by
contract mergers and the result in cases involving vertical ownership mergers
is manifest. In both situations, competitors are foreclosed. "Every extended
vertical arrangement by its very nature, for at least a time, denies to com-
petitors of the supplier the opportunity to compete for part or all of the trade
of the customer-party to the vertical arrangement." 58
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,59 a landmark case dealing with a
merger having both horizontal and vertical aspects, the Supreme Court laid
down the criteria of illegality for a vertical merger. Although not to be con-
sidered determinative, the Court first required analysis of the size of the
market foreclosed 8 0 Second, the Court stated that a "most important"
factor to be considered is the nature and purpose of the arrangement." The
Court discussed at this point the "failing company" doctrine of International
Shoe Co. v. FTC, 92 and the merger of two small companies in order to
enable them to compete with larger corporations dominating the market."
Third, the Court felt that the "trend toward concentration in the industry"
was a factor to be considered." Finally, the effect of the merger on "the
economic way of life sought to be preserved by Congress" must be con-
sidered."
Each of the undesirable effects mentioned in Brown Shoe as relevant for
proof of a violation of section 7 by vertical merger may also be caused by
the TBA sales commission contracts. Applying the Brown Shoe factors to
the Texaco case, the following results appear: (1) the Texaco distribution
system covers over 30,000 dealers representing 16.5 percent of all the service
stations in the country; 88 (2) neither Texaco nor B.F. Goodrich were failing
companies and both were giants in their respective industries; (3) when the
Shell and Atlantic TBA systems are added to the Texaco system, and the 20
other TBA plans in which Goodyear was involved, not to mention any
others that might be run by the other major oil companies, are considered,
"the trend toward concentration in the industry" is apparent; (4) the effect
of the TBA plan upon "local control of industry and upon small business""
in the form of the service station operator appears to be exactly what Con-
gress intended to prevent by enacting section 7. Thus if the Texaco case
involved an ownership merger, it is likely that the Supreme Court, following
58 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
58 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
60 Id. at 328.
61 Id. at 329.
02 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
63 370 U.S. at 331.
64 Id. at 332.
65 Id. at 333.
66 In Brown Shoe, the customer, Kinney, had 400 stores out of a total of 70,000
retail shoe outlets and made less than 2% of all shoe sales. 370 U.S. at 300, 303. The
significance of Texaco'i position in the distribution of gasoline becomes apparent when
its size is compared with that of Atlantic. Prior to the institution of the TBA cases,
Atlantic had approximately 5000 contract and lessee stations. Thus Texaco was six
times larger than Atlantic. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. at 363.
67 370 U.S. at 333.
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its Brown Shoe precedent would find a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 68
The Texaco-Goodrich sales commission plan might also be viewed as
having the less apparent yet significant structural aspects of a product exten-
sion merger. Generally speaking, the term "product extension merger" applies
to a merger when the products of the acquired company are complementary to
those of the acquiring company and may be produced with similar facilities,
marketed through the same channels and advertised by the same media."
In short, the whole technique of marketing the acquired product is almost
indistinguishable from that employed by the acquiring company in marketing
its own product.
The recent Supreme Court case, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,"
illustrates the product extension concept. Procter, a large diversified manu-
facturer of high turnover household cleaning products, acquired the Clorox
Company, the nation's largest producer of household liquid bleach. Packaged
detergents, Procter's major product line, and liquid bleach are used com-
plementarily in the washing of clothes and fabrics and in general household
cleaning. Both products are marketed chiefly through grocery stores and
receive the benefit of massive advertising and sales promotions by the manu-
facturer.
The Supreme Court struck down this merger as a violation of Section
7 of the Clayton Act because it was "fraught" with anticompetitive effects. 71
As the most serious of the anticompetitive effects flowing from this merger
the Court listed, "the substitution of the powerful acquiring firm for the
smaller, but already dominant, firm" 72 which the Court said, "may sub-
stantially reduce the competitive structure of the industry by raising entry
barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from aggressively competing." 73
There were several reasons why these anticompetitive effects flowed from
this merger. First, Proctor had a much larger advertising budget than any
bleach manufacturer and could divert a substantial amount of that budget
to promote Clorox bleach. 74 Second, Procter would be able to use the volume
discounts it obtained as the nation's largest advertiser to advantage in ad-
vertising Clorox bleach." Third, Procter's marketing practices would be
easily adaptable to the liquid bleach business because of the similar nature
of the Procter and Clorox products." Finally, the Court apparently agreed
with the FTC that the retailers might be induced to give Clorox preferred
shelf space since it would be manufactured by Procter which also produced
a number of other products marketed by the retailers." By these means the
great size and market power of Procter could be exercised in a manner which
68 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
69 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
7° 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
7i Id. at 578. 	 •
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 579.
75 Id.
78 Id. at 577-78.
77 Id. at 575.
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would make it difficult for small competitors of Clorox to market their
product. These marketing difficulties can be serious indeed when the product
being sold is chemically identical to all other such products and advertising
is the only way to differentiate one product from another.
The TBA sales commission plan, while not exactly parallel to the
Procter & Gamble situation, involves similar marketing considerations which
produce the anticompetitive effects.
The products of Texaco (oil and gasoline) and Goodrich (TBA) are
complementary in that they both are employed to service automobiles. The
service station is a very practical place to sell TBA and in fact the Profit
from such sales represents a significant part of the service station dealer's
income. Furthermore, Texaco's position in the service station market might
be generally equated to Procter's position in the household cleaning market
and the competitive results of those positions are similar. In essence, Procter's
strength in the advertising market and its ability to command preferential
shelf space from retailers gave Clorox products a great advantage over com-
petitors. Likewise, under the TBA sales commission plan, Texaco's market
power over its dealers permits the producer of the sponsored TBA easier access
to the marketing facilities of the "independent" businessmen who market
the sponsor's petroleum products. Through contract merger, Goodrich,
which is able to participate in the sales commission plan because of its size,
is borrowing Texaco's influence over its dealers to promote its TBA. This
gives Goodrich a substantial competitive advantage over other TBA suppliers
in the market of its TBA partner. ,
This discussion does not mean to imply that section 7 may be used to
condemn the TBA arrangement. Section 7 may only be used to reach owner-
ship mergers. The import of this discussion is to demonstrate that the unde-
sirable effects of an ownership merger on industry structure can be achieved
by methods immune from attack under section 7 and thus to underscore the
importance of prohibiting the "practice" before market structure can be ad-
versely affected.
In conclusion, then, it would seem that the Texaco court's decision that
a noncoercive sales commission plan is free from the proscription of Section
5 of the FTC Act is erroneous. The existence of a participating oil company's
dominant economic power over its dealers should be the sole factor necessary
to make such a plan illegal. The concept of a sales commission plan con-
templates that the leverage obtained from such power will direct the buying
preferences of the oil company's dealers to oil company-sponsored TBA.
Coupling this consideration with the fact that only major TBA suppliers
can employ such plans, it would seem that the natural result of their use
would be to restrict competition by foreclosing the smaller TBA suppliers
from the substantial service station markets. Since this result springs from the
sales commission plan even in the absence of a conscious exercise of the
sponsor's dominant economic power and since the economics of the petroleum
industry make it impossible to dissipate the power of the refiners over their
service stations, the sales commission method of distribution must be elim-
inated as an "unfair method of competition" in order to eliminate the evil.
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